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A growing literature has shed new light on interactions between the Soviet Union 
and Africa, notably through studies of the large numbers of African students who 
arrived in Moscow from 1960. Scholars have, however, largely ignored the many 
thousands of African military trainees who arrived in the same period. Here we 
begin to explore soldiers’ experiences through a focus on intelligence cadres of the 
Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU). We ask how their Soviet sojourns shaped 
their lives and ZAPU’s struggle, and consider the strengths and limits of oral 
histories in going beyond questions of strategy and Cold War binaries.  ZAPU 
trainees depicted themselves as men of education and political sophistication who 
were able to shape the content of their training and make efficacious use of it. 
Their most abiding political lessons came from the understanding they gained of 
Soviet history – particularly the sacrifices of the Great Patriotic War – and their 
experiences of ‘living socialism’. What these cadres depicted as Soviet 
egalitarianism, anti-racism, and state provision for basic needs held a powerful 
appeal due to the dramatic contrast to settler-ruled Rhodesia. Soviet support 
certainly influenced ZAPU, but these accounts indicate that it did so in negotiated, 
pragmatic and at times surprising ways that were shaped by interactions with 
many other foreign hosts, the influence of a specifically Rhodesian history of 
discrimination and oppression, and ZAPU’s own assessment of its military needs.  
 
Introduction 
The arrival of African soldiers in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s took 
place at the confluence of decolonisation, post-Stalinist openings to foreign 
influence, and the rise of Cold War competition among the super powers. Their 
travels were part of an extraordinary and ‘unexpected circulation of goods, 
people and information along new channels and across discontinuous world 
areas’.2 In the USSR, the ‘remarkable spectacle’ of the 1957 Youth Festival in 
Moscow brought thousands of African youth and students to the city and 
heralded a vast expansion in opportunities for Africans to study. This moment 
gave way to more pragmatic and more militarised interactions following the 
                                                        
1 Our thanks are owed to Abel Mazinyane, Zephaniah Nkomo, and Pathisa Nyathi for their 
generous help in introducing us to interviewees and for sharing their own deep knowledge with 
us. The time and thoughts of all our informants are very gratefully acknowledged. The article also 
benefitted from the insights of our anonymous JSAS readers and the careful and informed 
reading of Blessing-Miles Tendi. 
2 J. F. Goncalves, ‘Sputnik Premiers in Havana: A Historical Ethnography of the 1960 Soviet 
Explosion’, in A. E. Gorusch and D. Koenker (eds), The Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the 
Second World (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2013), p. 86, quoted in Q. Slobodian, 
‘Introduction’, in Q. Slobodian (ed.), Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World (New 
York, Berghahn, 2015), p. 1. Also see Robert J. McMahon (ed.), The Cold War in the Third World 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013), and S. Christiansen and Z. A. Scarlett (eds), The Third 
World in the Global 1960s (New York, Berghahn, 2013). 
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Sino-Soviet split, Khrushchev’s fall and the rise of the ‘hot’ cold war.3 African 
experiences in the Soviet Union in this period are just beginning to be explored. 
Recent scholarship has focused on students’ lives, telling a story of excitement 
and opportunity alongside disillusionment and dissent, the latter rooted in the 
experience of limited liberties, the realities of racism, and the dull poverty of 
life.4 Researchers have, however, largely ignored the many thousands of African 
military cadres who trained in the Soviet Union in these decades.5  
The Soviet Union’s support for liberation struggles was, of course, 
tremendously influential. Vladimir Shubin applauds Soviet assistance to 
Southern African liberation movements in particular as one of the great 
successes of Soviet opposition to colonialism and racism.6 It was certainly easier 
for the USSR to claim a moral high ground in opposing white minority rule than it 
was in regard to other interventions on the continent, such as in the Horn of 
Africa.7 Others have cast Soviet and Eastern Bloc support for southern African 
liberation movements as a route through which perniciously authoritarian 
practices were instilled, with long lasting consequences.8 Whether positive or 
negative, these scholars tend to neglect social and experiential aspects of 
liberation histories. Here we seek to build on studies of Cold War-era relations 
                                                        
3 On the Youth Festival, see M. Matusevich, ‘Journeys of Hope: African Diaspora and the Soviet 
Society’, African Diaspora, 1, 102 (2008), p. 69. On the USSR’s shift to military support for 
liberation struggles following the Sino-Soviet split, see J. Friedman, ‘Soviet Policy in the 
Developing World and the Chinese Challenge in the 1960s’, Cold War History, 10, 2 (2010), pp. 
247-72. 
4 E.g., J. Hessler, ‘Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics and the Cold War’, Cahiers 
du Monde Russe, 47, 1 (2006), pp. 33-63; A. J. Kret, ‘“We Unite through Knowledge”: The Peoples’ 
Friendship University and Soviet Education for the Third World’, Comparative Studies of South 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 33, 2 (2013), pp. 239-56; M. Matusevich,‘Probing the Limits of 
Internationalism: African Students confront Soviet Ritual’, Anthropology of East Europe Review, 
27, 2 (2009), pp. 19-39. For new work on the GDR see Slobodian, Comrades of Color, especially 
chapters by S. Pugach, ‘African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender in the German 
Democratic Republic’, pp. 131-56, and J. Verber, ‘True to the Politics of Frelimo? Teaching 
Socialism at the Schule der Freundschaft, 1981-90’, pp. 188-212. 
5 Shubin emphasizes scholarly neglect of the military role in the USSR’s relationships with 
African liberation movements. V. Shubin, ‘Unsung Heroes: The Soviet Military and the Liberation 
of Southern Africa’, in S. Onslow (ed.), Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation 
(London, Routledge, 2009), pp. 154-76.  
6 See V. Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold War’: The USSR in Southern Africa (London, Pluto Press, 2008), and 
‘The Soviet Union/Russian Federation’s Relations with South Africa, with special reference to the 
period since 1980’, African Affairs, 95, 378 (1996), pp. 5-30. 
7 As M. Matusevich, ‘Revisiting the Soviet Moment in Sub-Saharan Africa’, History Compass, 7, 5 
(2009), pp. 1264-5, points out.  
8 In relation to the South African ANC and SWAPO, see S. Ellis, External Mission: The ANC in exile 
1960-1990 (London, Hurst and Co., 2012), and its precursor, S. Ellis and T. Sechaba [pseud.], 
Comrades against Apartheid: The ANC and the South African Communist Party in Exile (London, 
James Currey, 1992), P. Trewhela, Inside Quatro: Uncovering the Exile History of the ANC and 
SWAPO (Auckland Park, Jacana, 2009), and the intense debate that this work sparked (regarding 
the ANC) in, e.g., T. Lodge, ‘Clandestine Histories: The ANC in Exile’, Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 40, 2 (2014), pp. 419-24; P. Landau, ‘Controlled by Communists? (Re)Assessing the ANC 
in its Exilic Decades’, South African Historical Journal, 67, 2 (2015), pp. 222-41; A. Lissoni, ‘New 
Sources, Old Story: Revisionism and South African struggle history’, ms., 2016. With regard to the 
MPLA in Angola, Ricardo Soares de Oliveira argues for a profound ‘Eastern bloc institutional 
legacy’ (or ‘blueprint’) evidenced in ‘recognizably Leninist structures’. See his Magnificent and 
Beggar Land: Angola since the Civil War (London, Hurst and Co., 2015), p. 101. Also see J. J. Byrne, 
‘Africa’s Cold War’, in McMahon, The Cold War, pp. 107-111. 
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between the Eastern Bloc and the Global South that look at a wider set of 
interactions and emphasise the complexity of influences and exchanges between 
‘Second’ and ‘Third’ Worlds. This work goes beyond the binaries of 
contemporary political rhetoric, and introduces social and cultural questions 
into debates that have been dominated by matters of strategy, diplomacy and 
high-level politics.9  
The somewhat narrow contours of the literature on African liberation 
movements’ relationships with their Soviet and East European supporters are in 
part owed to the limited access to archives on both sides. A number of key 
authors, themselves participants in state solidarity structures, have had 
privileged access to official materials and have made groundbreaking 
contributions based on them. Thus, Vladimir Shubin’s writing is central to 
understandings of Southern African liberation movements’ relations with the 
USSR while Hans-Georg and Ilona Schleicher’s work occupies a similar place vis-
a-vis East Germany.10 Shubin and Hans-Georg Schleicher have represented these 
country’s roles in the major collections on liberation struggles produced by the 
South African Democracy Education Trust under the patronage of former South 
African President Thabo Mbeki, and the SADC Hashim Mbita Project.11 These are 
not official histories and represent varied perspectives, but they share a stance 
that is sympathetic to liberation movements and the goals of Eastern Bloc 
support.  
A new generation of researchers who are neither participants nor 
activists has begun to pose fresh questions of archives opened in the aftermath 
of the Cold War, notably in East Germany, and scholars have interviewed a wide 
range of solidarity activists.12 Yet it is notable across this scholarship that there 
are few attempts to interview Africans about their experiences in the Eastern 
Bloc, and there is a marked dearth of military trainees’ views. Those African 
soldiers whose accounts do appear in this literature tend to be senior liberation 
movement figures, many of them speaking as holders (or one-time holders) of 
high political or military office, and they tend to be invoked to address strategic 
questions, document significant solidarity activities, or demonstrate the success 
                                                        
9 See discussion in Slobodian, ‘Introduction’, p. 3. 
10 See for example, Shubin, The Hot ‘Cold War’, H.-G. Schleicher and I. Schleicher, Special Flights: 
the GDR and the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa (Harare, SAPES Books, 1998).  For 
discussion of writing by ‘participants’, see T. Weis, ‘The Politics Machine: On the concept of 
‘Solidarity’ in East German support for SWAPO’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 2 (2011), pp. 
351-67 and S. Stevens, ‘Bloke Modisane in East Germany’, in Slobodian, Comrades of Color, pp. 
121-130. 
11 See V. Shubin with M. Traikova, ‘There is no threat from the Eastern Bloc’, and H.-G. Schleicher, 
‘The German Democratic Republic and the South African Liberation Struggle’, in SADET, The Road 
to Democracy in South Africa, Volume Three, International Solidarity (Pretoria, UNISA Press, 2008) 
and V. Shubin, ‘The Soviet Union and the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa’, and H.-G. 
Schleicher, ‘The German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Liberation of Southern Africa’, in A. J. 
Temu and J. das N. Tembe (eds), Southern African Liberation Struggles, Volume Eight, Countries 
and Regions Outside SADC  (Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2014). 
12 Some key contributions in English with regard to the GDR are in Slobodian, Comrades of Color. 
There is a growing literature on liberation movements in exile and international solidarity 
(dominated by the South African ANC and the Anti-Apartheid Movement) that has explored 
Western and African hosts and solidarity movements. For an excellent review, see H. Sapire, 
‘Liberation Movements, Exile and International Solidarity: An Introduction’, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, 35, 2, pp. 271-86, and contributions to that special journal issue. 
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of Eastern Bloc support, rather than to explore social questions.13 What is 
nonetheless clear from this growing body of work is the diversity of experiences 
and engagements over time, the considerable differences among Eastern Bloc 
(and other) hosts, and the heterogeneous character of liberation movements.14 
How might oral histories allow us to explore this history further? What might a 
focus on the social or cultural aspects of African soldiers’ experiences in the 
USSR reveal? Would their experiences mirror those of African students? Might 
their accounts echo those of African soldiers trained elsewhere? How did 
soldiers come to see their Soviet hosts, and in what ways were their narratives 
shaped by a distinctive lens?  
We have sought to explore some of these questions by interviewing 
former members of ZAPU’s intelligence wings who trained in the Soviet Union 
between 1964 and the end of Zimbabwe’s liberation war in 1979. We spoke with 
seven such men, identifying them through our long-standing research 
relationship with members of ZAPU and its armed wing.15 We focused on 
military intelligence training because it offered a wider range of engagements 
with Soviet instructors and hosts than its strictly military analogue. It typically 
combined stints at the Perevalnoye military training centre (located on the 
outskirts of Simferapol on the Crimean peninsula) with academic, political and 
technical training at the ‘Northern Training Camp’ in Moscow and other 
locations.16 The trainees lived in cities and they visited far flung sites such as 
agricultural cooperatives and monuments. These experiences differed from 
those of other military cadres in the USSR, as well as from our interviewees’ (and 
many others’) experiences of training in African countries such as Zambia, 
Tanzania, Mozambique and Angola, where they lived in military camps governed 
(more or less) directly by the liberation movement.17 While intelligence cadres’ 
Soviet training allowed diverse and new experiences, their stays were 
nonetheless regimented, utilitarian and relatively short-term (usually eight to 
eleven months) when compared to those of African students.18  
                                                        
13 E.g., Shubin, ‘Unsung Heroes’. Memoirs and biographies have added valuable insights, but also 
often represent the views of influential individuals. On experiences in the USSR, see, e.g., B. 
Gilder, Songs and Secrets: South Africa from Liberation to Governance (London, Hurst and Co., 
2012), chapter 2, and H. Macmillan, Chris Hani (Auckland Park, Jacana, 2014), pp. 27-9. On the 
profusion of struggle memoirs generally, see Sapire, ‘Liberation Movements’, p. 277 and passim. 
14 For a poignant example of the dramatically different positions and interpretations among 
South African visitors to the GDR, see Stevens, ‘Bloke Modisane’.  
15 See J. Alexander, J. McGregor and T. Ranger, Violence and Memory: One Hundred Years in the 
‘Dark Forests’ of Matabeleland (Oxford, James Currey, 2000). Since the publication of this book, 
both of us have interviewed many other members of ZAPU about their exile (and other) 
experiences in the military and party. We do not draw on this work here save in passing. 
16 See Shubin, ‘Unsung Heroes’, pp. 160-62, on ZAPU and passim for an account of the military 
facilities and training offered southern African liberation movements in the USSR. 
17 The story of soldiers’ experiences of the camps is complex and varied – we cannot delve into in 
depth here. For an excellent book-length study (and exploration of a fast growing literature), see 
C. Williams, National Liberation in Postcolonial Southern Africa: A Historical Ethnography of 
SWAPO’s Exile Camps (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015), and for a particularly 
insightful consideration of evidence and interpretation in the study of a camp, see S. Davis, 
‘Training and Deployment at Novo Catengue and the Diaries of Jack Simons, 1977-1979’, Journal 
of Southern African Studies, 40, 6, (2014), pp. 1325-42. 
18 African students usually spent a minimum of five years in the USSR. Their diverse motives and 
aspirations and their less regulated interactions allowed for a more intimate knowledge of Soviet 
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Military intelligence training in the Soviet Union thus constituted a 
distinct category in some ways, yet the seven men we interviewed also had 
varied experiences and told varied stories. In part this was because they left for 
the USSR at different junctures in ZAPU’s history. Some were trained at the 
outset of the armed struggle in the early 1960s when sabotage was the party’s 
leading strategy. Others left in the aftermath of ZAPU’s internal crisis in the early 
1970s, when military action was paralysed and relations with the Soviet Union 
were strained. Still others trained in the USSR at the height of ZAPU’s military 
expansion in the late 1970s, just as it was consolidating a powerful, conventional 
‘military machine’. Differences also arose from the diverse positions our 
interviewees held over the course of the struggle and subsequently. Some 
became prominent war-time figures. Most notably, Dumiso Dabengwa, who was 
one of the earliest recruits to ZAPU’s nascent intelligence wing, headed the 
National Security Organization (NSO), an overarching security and intelligence 
unit created in 1978 and which held civilian, military and strategic briefs.19 Abel 
Mazinyane served in top posts in ZIPRA’s military intelligence until he was 
posted to Yugoslavia in 1978.20 Our other interviewees were less senior, some 
holding posts in the NSO, but most serving in the NSO’s ranks towards the end of 
the war. An unusual cadre was Ronnie Patel, one of the very few Asians to join 
the liberation struggle. NSO members on the whole tended to be drawn from the 
better educated ranks of ZAPU cadres (an ‘O’-level education was considered a 
minimum qualification, according to NSO members) owing to the organisation’s 
key role in anticipating post-independence state-building. 
Unusually, given the seniority of some of these men, none held positions 
of power in government or military at the time of our interviews. This was 
largely due to the ongoing consequences of the violent marginalization of ZAPU 
at the hands of the ruling ZANU(PF) – the Zimbabwe African National Union 
(Patriotic Front) – in the 1980s. Most of our interviewees suffered persecution in 
that period, though several, including Dabengwa (who was imprisoned for many 
years on charges of treason) emerged to take up senior government posts after 
ZAPU was subsumed in ZANU(PF) under the Unity Accord of 1987. Others such 
as Lazarus Ncube managed to retain positions in the Zimbabwe National Army 
from 1980 to the early 2000s. Dabengwa left the ruling party in December 2007 
and went on to lead a group of former ZAPU cadres who rejected the Unity 
Accord and set out to ‘resuscitate’ the original ZAPU.21 His prominent past 
alongside this position gave him a public profile in on-going debates over 
liberation war history, war veteran affairs and other political matters. 
Unsurprisingly, none of our interviewees were interested in constructing 
narratives designed to legitimise the regime in power: their stories had heroic 
                                                                                                                                                              
society than that of soldiers of most kinds. On African students at the Peoples’ Friendship 
University in Moscow, see Kret, ‘“We Unite with Knowledge”’, p. 243 and passim.   
19 See J. Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens: The Military Strategy of ZAPU, 1976-79’, in N. 
Bhebe and T. Ranger (eds), Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (London, James Currey, 1995), 
pp. 54-55, on the influential role of the NSO and Dabengwa. 
20 Mazinyane’s career is discussed in P. Nyathi, The Story of a ZPRA Cadre: Nicholas Macala Dube 
‘Ben Mvelase’ Biography (Bulwayo, Amagugu Publishers, 2014), pp. 168-71. According to Nyathi, 
Mazinyane was appointed as deputy chief of military intelligence under Gordon Munyanyi in 
1976 and subsequently served under Dingani Mlilo before becoming chief of military intelligence 
in 1977, a post he held until sometime in 1978.  
21 Email communication, Dumiso Dabengwa to Jocelyn Alexander, 21 September 2016.  
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elements but they ended in marginality and frustration, and all portrayed 
ZANU(PF)’s public representation of the history of the armed struggle as a 
distortion of ZAPU’s past. Dabengwa and Mazinyane have engaged in history 
writing themselves, while all our interviewees have been involved in veterans’ 
organizations concerned to document ZAPU’s struggle.22 The ongoing debates 
over liberation war history and its political uses in the present motivated our 
interviewees to tell their stories and to tell them in particular ways, with an 
emphasis on ZAPU’s military and other strengths as a liberation movement and 
the terrible waste that followed from their exclusion from power after 1980. 
These agendas undoubtedly shaped our interviewees’ accounts: they told 
their stories with a sense of the need for historical redress as well as with great 
pride in ZAPU’s particular character and accomplishments. The narratives are 
important in alerting us to an ongoing demand for recognition, but they also tell 
stories that illuminate the specific nature of Soviet experiences as distinct from 
other war-time episodes. We focus here on the commonalities that marked these 
narratives in order to explore the issues that were – and are – significant to all 
our interviewees. First, none of our interviewees portrayed themselves as 
passive subjects: these were not stories of the imposition or straightforward 
replication of ideas or practices. Their sense of their capacity to shape the 
content and uses of their training (both military and ideological) hinged on a 
depiction of themselves as politically sophisticated, educated men with a clear 
sense of the particular demands of their struggle. Second, these ZAPU cadres 
stressed that the formation of their political views in the USSR owed less to 
ideological teaching than to the lessons they drew from their exposure to the 
history of World War II and from their observation of Soviet society, both filtered 
through the understandings of racial discrimination and inequality that they had 
brought with them from Rhodesia. Finally, these men made clear that the effects 
of Soviet exposure on ZAPU’s armed struggle could not be considered in 
isolation. Ideas, tactics and technical knowledge derived from the Soviet Union 
were adopted selectively and often combined with knowledge gained from other 
experiences of training, mobilising and fighting in and out of southern Africa. 
Before we elaborate on these points, we briefly explore our interviewees’ 
accounts of their arrival in the Soviet Union. These stories told of surprise, 
gratitude and ambiguity – foreshadowing subsequent interactions – and 




How did African military trainees imagine the Soviet Union and what did they 
make of their first encounters? While many of our interviewees had prior 
experience of foreign training, they had very little idea of what to expect of the 
                                                        
22 See D. Dabengwa, ‘ZIPRA in the Zimbabwe War of National Liberation’, in N. Bhebe and T. 
Ranger (eds), Soldiers in Zimbabwe’s Liberation War (London, James Currey, 1995), pp. 24-35. 
Mazinyane has written for some time on struggle history for the Sunday News, one of the main 
Zimbabwean papers. On ZIPRA soldiers’ narratives in the mid-1990s and early 2000s, see J. 
Alexander and J. McGregor, ‘War Stories: Guerrilla Narratives of Zimbabwe’s Liberation War’, 
History Workshop Journal, 57, (2004), pp. 79-100. For the important work of the Mafela Trust 
(made up of veterans) in documenting ZIPRA history, see J. Brickhill, ‘Making Peace with the Past: 
War Victims and the Work of the Mafela Trust’, in Bhebe and Ranger, Soldiers, pp. 163-73. 
 7 
Soviet Union, though the place had a certain shadowy presence and enigmatic 
attraction. 
Dumiso Dabengwa was among the earliest of ZAPU’s arrivals in the Soviet 
Union. He landed in Moscow in 1964 as the 24-year-old leader of a group of six 
cadres sent for military intelligence training by James Chikerema, the head of 
ZAPU’s nascent military wing, the Department of Special Affairs. As a member of 
ZAPU’s youth wing in Bulawayo, Dabengwa had been involved in an expanding 
campaign of sabotage. He had come into contact with cadres trained in China and 
had used bombs as well as grenades smuggled from the Congo, somewhat 
inexpertly – he and his youth league comrades had had no formal military 
training. The Soviet Union offered the possibility of far more serious military 
engagement. Dabengwa explained, ‘we had all sorts of raw experiences. What 
was exciting to us was to be able to learn the real thing and how to do it 
properly.’ But, he admitted, they had ‘no idea what we would find’ in the Soviet 
Union.23 This lack of foreknowledge was echoed across accounts. Marshall 
Mpofu’s ideas, for example, derived from his ‘O’ level studies: ‘We’d only read 
about the USSR, and World War One and World War Two, and the part that the 
allied forces played against Hitler.’24 
Dabengwa’s group travelled to Moscow from Lusaka, via Dar es Salaam 
and Sudan. On arrival at the airport, they were met by hosts bearing warm coats: 
the first encounter with the USSR’s wintry weather formed a visceral memory for 
most of the trainees, often coupled with accounts of the care their hosts took to 
ease the chill.25 When Zephaniah Moyo arrived in Moscow in late 1977, he too 
remembered the ‘big coat’ he was given, and the ‘balaclava where you close your 
ears’.26 He vividly recalled the snowy scene in Moscow:  
 
when we arrived we were shocked. We were seeing people seated with 
their little sticks, putting them in, out, in, out. We didn’t realise they were 
sitting on top of Moscow River, fishing…. It was just white! ... We thought 
they were catching small insects on the ground.27 
  
Abel Mazinyane flew with a group to the Soviet Union in 1972, following training 
in Zambia and Tanzania. He recalled: ‘when we first arrived in Moscow, the 
weather, you could tell you were somewhere else!’ His group was grateful for the 
thoughtfulness of their hosts, as Mazinyane remembered in great detail:  
 
on arrival, immediately someone came to the place and advised us not to 
come out of the plane. So we remained in the plane in our short-sleeved 
shirts. We got coats, we put them on, they drove the small minibus under 
                                                        
23 Interview, Dumiso Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 13 December 2014.  
24 Interview, Marshall Mpofu, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. Also see, e.g., Interview, Lazarus 
Ncube, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. For others, the unknown quantity of the Soviet Union 
sparked a fearful imagination. Former ZIPRA commander Nicholas Nkomo describes wondering 
whether he would find a place ‘populated by normal people without tails and fangs’ when he was 
sent to the Soviet Union for military training in 1975. N. Nkomo, Between the Hammer and the 
Anvil: The Autobiography of Nicholas Nkomo, ms., n.d., p. 16. 
25 Interview, Dabengwa, Bulawayo. 
26 Interview, Zephaniah Moyo, Bulawayo, 9 December 2014. 
27 Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo.  On wintry conditions also see interview, Stool Matiwaza, 
Bulawayo, 10 December 2014. 
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the wing of the plane, right at the door, [so] we could get straight in the 
minibus [which] was already warm. 
 
The literal and metaphorical warmth of this welcome was reinforced shortly 
thereafter by the provision of what was, from Mazinyane’s point of view, a 
sumptuous meal: ‘they gave us a bowl of soup and black bread – for us guerrillas, 
we’d come from camps, we thought that was the main meal. But it was the first 
course of a three course meal! A sort of culture shock. A three course meal! Oh!’28 
Just as the cold, snow and food marked the Soviet Union out as different 
from Rhodesia and the varied African host countries these men had previously 
visited, so did the experience of arriving in a country in which people were 
predominantly white, as we explore further below. In these first interactions, 
racial difference cast a pall of suspicion most notably over the medical 
examinations to which military trainees were routinely subjected on arrival. 
These involved an intrusive physical examination followed by a shower and the 
incineration of one’s clothes. Such practices were at times interpreted in the light 
of knowledge of white Rhodesian views of African hygiene, and longstanding 
practices of medical screening in Southern Africa’s towns and mines. Abel 
Mazinyane wondered, did they ‘think we’re not a bathing people? You know, 
coming out, a contact with a white person was always taken with suspicion.’29 
These wary initial reactions were common, but they tended not to last as 
the business of training took centre stage and as interactions with Soviet trainers 
and society broadened cadres’ experiences and reshaped their views.  
 
Autonomy, Training and Political Identity 
The literature on African students in the Soviet Union in the 1960s and 1970s 
emphasises their relative freedoms. Students were able to express dissent more 
easily than their Soviet counterparts and they contested restrictions on political 
expression, challenged racism, and complained of poor living conditions. 
Students’ capacity to protest partly reflected the Soviet desire to protect its anti-
racist and anti-imperialist credentials.30 Unlike students, the ZAPU military 
cadres we spoke to anticipated an austere, regimented existence. Most had prior 
experience of military camps and training and they did not expect material 
comforts or opportunities for protest. However, and in stark contrast to accounts 
of life in military camps in African host countries, all generations of cadres we 
interviewed described negotiating the content of their training directly with 
Soviet instructors, whom they cast as sympathetic. In explaining their ability to 
negotiate, they drew on a pervasive self-image of ZAPU as educated, professional 
                                                        
28 Interview, Abel Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. 
29 Interview, Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. Nicholas Nkomo recounts a similar 
moment of anger and doubt during his medical screening: ‘This action by the bloody communists 
reminded us of the treatment we used to get from the whites back home…. Were they doing all 
this to use because we were black and might affect the superior race with our animalistic 
diseases?’ Nkomo, Between the Hammer and the Anvil, p. 16. But compare to Dabengwa, this 
issue. 
30 See Kret, ‘“We Unite with Knowledge’’’ and Matusevich, ‘An Exotic Subversive’. Compare to 
Pugach, ‘African Students’, on the GDR. Pugach explores the variations in official reactions to 
African students’ demands and what were seen as moral and sexual transgressions.  She notes 
that tolerance was shaped by a desire to distance the GDR from the Nazi past and to distinguish it 
from the FRG and the West generally.  
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and loyal to a disciplined party, characteristics that they considered 
distinguished them from other liberation movements, and merited the respect of 
their Soviet instructors.31 
Dabengwa’s account of interaction and negotiation related to the early 
days of ZAPU’s relationship with the Soviet Union, and exemplified the sense of 
goodwill and exchange that permeated our interviewees’ accounts. His group 
was taken straight to a house in the suburbs of Moscow, where a ‘Commandant’ 
explained logistical arrangements and left them to settle for the weekend. When 
they met their instructor a few days later, they set about discussing the content 
of their training. As Dabengwa explained: 
 
The training director… gave us the full description of what our course 
would comprise of. He wanted to know if there was anything that they 
had left out that we think we needed to be trained in. So we had those 
discussions and finally came up with a full training programme which 
involved some of the things we’d mentioned.  
 
Dabengwa said that his group insisted that they ‘wanted to know all the weapons 
that would be used by all our detachments right up to the anti-air guns, and get 
some experience, even if we didn’t fire them, get to understand how they operate 
and that kind of thing.’ They also wanted some very practical knowledge for the 
purposes of sabotage: ‘We wanted to know how we could get our own 
explosives.’32  
Shubin’s account of the training of ANC cadres in this early period makes 
it clear that, from the start, the Soviet military worked to provide guerrilla 
training appropriate to the needs of the southern African movements, drawing 
on its own experiences in World War II in doing so.33 Among later cohorts of 
ZAPU cadres, there was in addition great praise for the advanced technology 
supplied by the Soviets, and the military power it delivered, whether it was 
aimed at stopping the Americans in Vietnam or the Rhodesian Army. Veneration 
of technical capacity was very much a part of the Soviet ethos of this time and it 
certainly awed trainees.34 The ZAPU cadres also consistently stressed the 
importance of adapting Soviet training and technology to the challenges of the 
Rhodesian war, which differed both from other southern African contexts and 
from the conditions faced by Soviet partisans in World War II. Weapons, for 
example, needed to be modified to suit the southern African climate. But the 
adaptations were more far-reaching than this. Abel Mazinyane explained that 
‘the ideas’ needed to be adjusted to take account of Rhodesia’s developed 
infrastructure and the dominance of Rhodesian air power. Transport and 
communications networks were such that, ‘the Rhodesian army could move 
immediately from here [Bulawayo] to the [Victoria] Falls within a day without 
                                                        
31 On ZAPU cadres’ self-image as ‘professionals’, most often elaborated in contrast to ZANU but, 
as we explore below, also other liberation movements, see Alexander, McGregor and Ranger, 
Violence and Memory, chapter 6; Brickhill, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens’, pp. 48-72.  
32 Interview, Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 13 December 2014. 
33 Shubin, ‘Unsung Heroes’, pp. 156-58. 
34 E.g., Interviews, Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014; Moyo, Bulawayo, 9 December 2014. 
Soviet technical prowess was of course a central element in Cold War competition, symbolized 
perhaps most famously by the Sputnik launch and the space race. 
 10 
coming across an obstacle, and then come back, [and] send their soldiers into the 
bush.’ This was not the case in countries such as Mozambique, where ‘the 
Portuguese had never been to the places they had to get to. So we had to adjust.’ 
In contrast to the Soviet experience, ZIPRA lacked an air force so, although, ‘The 
partisans could do some air drops for their supplies, with us, we had to carry 
ours.’ The collection of intelligence was also weighted towards ‘working with the 
population’ rather than the use of, for example, sophisticated listening devices.35 
The wartime context of the late 1970s altered ZAPU’s needs once more, 
driving the demands made of their Soviet hosts in new ways. Zephaniah Moyo, 
who arrived in the USSR in 1977, described adapting intelligence training to the 
demands of dealing with the influx of many thousands of recruits and refugees to 
Zambian camps. ZAPU needed to provide effective screening in order to identify 
infiltrators and to extend social services such as health and education. It was 
also, under the aegis of the newly instituted NSO, in the midst of developing 
extensive state-like institutions that required training police, border guards and 
customs officials.36 Moyo held that the Soviets were useful in technical areas 
such as providing mine and bomb detectors as well as in advising on how to 
create institutional structures, for instance to undertake border controls. But 
even institutional models needed adaptation. As Moyo explained: ‘you can get 
the information but it will [not] be easy to practice it in a foreign land where you 
don’t have enough resources, [where you are] working underground, [and] you 
can’t establish a big office and have all the people in one place.’37 In Zambia, 
ZAPU had learned to disperse its cadres to avoid capture, bombing and raids, and 
it created separate cells to minimize damage following capture.    
In negotiating these aspects of training over the years, these men felt they 
had the support and sympathy of their Soviet instructors. They illustrated this by 
narrating episodes in which their Soviet hosts showed concern for them as 
people, demonstrated not only by the warm coats and rich food they were given, 
but also their generous stipends. Marshall Mpofu explained that his monthly 
allowance of 25 rubles was ‘a lot of money’: it allowed him to buy his first suit.38 
The trainees also believed in the genuine nature of Soviet solidarity because 
military instruction was closely tied to significant flows of weaponry: Abel 
Mazinyane argued that the Soviets ‘went out of their way to help us. Sometimes 
we had weapons that were surpassing those of the armies that hosted us!’39 
Soviet support of this kind was also given to other liberation movements 
but our interviewees felt that their interactions were different. They held that 
they impressed their instructors more than most – the South African ANC 
excepted – due to their ability to learn quickly and exercise independent 
judgement as a result of what they considered their superior levels of education, 
experience of urban life, and political organisation. To an extent this self-
perception was based on real differences rooted in the relatively high levels of 
                                                        
35 Interview, Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. Adaptation of military training to 
Rhodesian conditions also occurred in other contexts. See Munguambe, this issue, on FRELIMO 
training of ZANLA, and W. Mhanda, Dzino. Memories of a Freedom Fighter (Harare, Weaver Press, 
2011) on Chinese training of ZANLA. 
36 Police were trained in Zambia, border guards in the Soviet Union and customs and immigration 
officials in Yugoslavia. Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo, 2 October 2008.  
37 Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014.  
38 Interview, Mpofu, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. 
39 Interview, Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. 
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education, urbanisation and formal sector employment in Rhodesia compared to 
the rest of the region (save South Africa), and to the longstanding practice of 
labour migration to South Africa’s cities and mines from ZAPU’s main recruiting 
regions of the 1970s.40 Mazinyane described how some cadres from 
Mozambique and Angola had ‘never been to town in their life’: they had ‘not been 
exposed’.  He thought ZAPU’s cadres were given more advanced training as a 
result of their excellent English and the fact that, ‘We were faster to assimilate 
things because of our exposure to towns’.41 Moyo reinforced the point, noting the 
ease with which his group undertook urban training assignments. He explained 
that, ‘when you train in intelligence from time to time you have to do some 
practical courses. Sometimes we were taken to the city, so they wanted to 
monitor us, our behaviour.’ While trainees from Guinea Bissau remained fixed in 
place, Moyo’s group covered great distances, surprising their instructors: 
 
They thought we were coming from underdeveloped countries in Africa 
where there were no cars, no robots [traffic lights]. They couldn’t believe 
we could cross robots, drive vehicles…. They had seen groups from 
various countries who were trained as guerrillas who were coming right 
from the rural background, without any experience of city life. Some of us 
had a lot of experience.  
 
Moyo held a Rhodesian driving license and had worked for many years for the 
Rhodesian police; his fellow cadres also had experience of urban employment, 
including one man who had worked for the Rhodesian Broadcasting Company.42 
ZAPU cadres also attributed their negotiating capacity to their 
movement’s discipline and political sophistication. They drew a contrast with the 
sloganeering and top-down hierarchies of other movements. As Abel Mazinyane 
explained, ‘Maybe that’s our interpretation, but … if one of the leaders came to 
visit, we had order. Others struggled to make that order we had.’ They cast this 
‘order’ as the product of an empowering political education that ran through the 
ranks:  
 
All our guys could answer anything about the party. What does ZAPU 
think about this? All of us could answer that to a certain point to satisfy 
the one asking. But these other colleagues were just cadres. Frelimo had 
slogans, but with us, even our own political orientation was a bit higher. 
                                                        
40 See Brickhill’s discussion, ‘Daring to Storm the Heavens’, pp. 65-67, in which he argues for ‘the 
predominance of recruits with experience of modern urban capitalism’ (p. 67). This was more 
likely to have been the case prior to ZIPRA’s rapid growth at the end of the 1970s when recruits 
tended to be younger and to come directly from rural areas. It should also be noted that the 
perception of ZIPRA as particularly ‘professional’ in the senses described by our interviewees 
was shared by others who interacted with both liberation armies at the end of the war, including 
members of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force, British Military Advisory Training Team, and 
Rhodesian Security Forces. See B-M. Tendi, ‘Soldiers contra Diplomats: Britain’s role in the 
Zimbabwe/Rhodesia ceasefire (1979-1980)’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 26, 6 (2015), pp. 937-
56; S. Rice, ‘The Commonwealth Initiative in Zimbabwe, 1979–1980: Implications for 
International Peacekeeping’ (University of Oxford, DPhil Thesis, 1990); and N. Kriger, Guerrilla 
Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2003). 
41 Interview, Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. 
42 Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo, 9 December 2014. 
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When we’d be asked to think about Marxism, we already had ideas…. 
Interaction with the leadership was also very free, there was a lot of 
flowing of information between the leaders and the cadres, unlike the 
others. I think they were given what they were supposed to know. Us, we 
could defend the party under whatever circumstances because we knew. 
They realized we’d raise questions that would challenge their system. 
That made them give us more than they thought we deserved. 43 
 
These practices, Mazinyane explained, were rooted in ZAPU’s longstanding 
committee structures inside Rhodesia, which meant cadres had often been 
recruited through the party and hence were politicised before they joined the 
armed struggle: ‘So you go to the Soviet Union, you already know there was a 
party, you want to compare your party with their party, which was highly 
developed.’ Mazinyane felt this was the reason ZAPU cadres were sent to the 
party school in Moscow along with South African MK cadres and guerrilla groups 
that had created liberated areas like the PAIGC.44   
Challenges to Soviet instructors were not always well met, of course, but 
nor were they ruled out.  ZIPRA cadres recalled successfully fighting for radios 
and access to the BBC World Service, which ordinary Russians were not allowed, 
and pressing their instructors to explain the meaning of political changes 
underway within the Soviet Union, such as the fall of Khrushchev.45 It is, 
however, the manifest utility of the military and technical training they gained 
that stands out in these accounts, rather than complaints or stories of imposition. 
For example, Lazarus Ncube described his Soviet training as superior to that in 
Zambia where facilities were lacking and to that in the Zimbabwe National Army 
after independence. In the Soviet Union, ‘the buildings and training were very 
impressive…. The most useful aspect was combat warfare and we were trained 
in mechanical and chemical warfare’. He recalled his intelligence training with 
great pride. It had included,  
 
collecting combat information by stealth, spying on the enemy, numbers, 
equipment, identifying aircraft, artillery, tanks. So we were specialists in 
equipment, routine, notes for attack. We really used that on return. Also 
analysing combat – making notes of events or sounds and submitting a 
report – I was good at that.46  
 
Stool Matiwaza felt his Soviet officer training had allowed him to make a real 
contribution to the struggle:  ‘we were taught up to brigade level … so we could 
come and teach other young soldiers how to be soldiers – that was the most 
important’.47 
These Zimbabwean cadres’ sense of their political and social identity was 
central to their accounts of the positive relationships they were able to build 
with Soviet instructors and the value they were able to derive from their 
                                                        
43 Interview, Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 December 2014. 
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technical and military training. These were above all stories of efficacy and 
empowerment.    
 
Ideology as History and ‘Living Socialism’ 
The sense of choice and agency expressed with regard to intelligence training 
also suffused our interviewees’ accounts of ideological lessons. Once again, their 
accounts differ from those of African students in the Eastern Bloc. Students at 
Moscow’s Friendship University were exempted from the ‘most ideologically 
fraught subjects such as the history of the Communist Party, political economy, 
Marxism-Leninism, and fundamentals of scientific communism’, all required of 
their Soviet counterparts, though they chafed nonetheless against political 
orthodoxies,48 while in East Germany they were ‘inundated with Marxist 
ideology’.49 Such experiences led to disaffection and for some a departure for the 
West.50 In our interviewee’s accounts, the classroom teaching of ideology did not 
stand at the heart of their political education, and nor did they feel a particular 
view was imposed upon them. They held that they were encouraged to make 
choices based on the conditions of their own societies, and emphasized how they 
absorbed political ideas indirectly and outside the classroom, most notably 
through learning about Soviet history and through their experience of ‘living 
socialism’, that is their interactions with and observations of Soviet society. In 
both cases, the views they formed were powerfully shaped by the comparative 
frame of their political and social experiences at home in Rhodesia.  
Soviet history, most importantly in the form of the Great Patriotic War, 
constituted a significant part of our interviewees’ accounts of their political 
education. Soviet instructors created a powerful sense of the suffering and 
sacrifice of World War II through the use of films and visits to memorials.51 This 
history was also dramatically embodied by those instructors who were World 
War II veterans of guerrilla war. As Shubin notes, the head of the ‘Northern 
Training Centre’ was for many years Major-General Fyodor Fedorenko, ‘an ex-
Second World War guerrilla commander in the Crimea’.52 For Dumiso Dabengwa, 
ideological training was ‘a history of the USSR really. They came in and … showed 
us how they had finally got to the stage where they formed the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union right down from Stalin and how they operated during the 
various wars they went through.’ He was inspired by films about World War II 
and the personal stories of the partisans who taught his group. Dabengwa found 
the films ‘of how the Russian army fought against the Germans … very moving’: 
‘the dedication that they had – we were quite impressed. It gave us an urge to 
come back home and be able to do the same.’53  
                                                        
48 Kert, ‘“We Unite with Knowledge’”, pp. 243-4. 
49 Pugach, ‘African students and the politics of race and gender’, p. 133. 
50 See Slobodian, ‘Socialist Chromatism’, p. 31; Slobodian, ‘Bandung in Divided Germany: 
Managing Non-aligned Politics in East and West, 1955-63’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History, 41, 4 (2013), pp. 653-4. 
51 Histories of World War II were also used to create an identification with the liberation 
movements among Eastern Bloc citizens. Slobodian, ‘Socialist Chromatism’, p. 32, notes ‘the 
depth of empathy felt by East German citizens for those struggling against invasion, occupation 
and racialized oppression, and the salience of a moralized sense of differentiation from the U.S.-
led bloc’, despite resentment of compulsory acts of solidarity. 
52 Shubin, ‘Unsung Heroes’, p. 156. 
53 Interview, Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 13 December 2014. 
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Such accounts were echoed among our interviewees across the 1960s and 
1970s. Referring to his training in the early 1970s, Abel Mazinyane recalled in 
vivid detail his historical lessons:  
 
they’d show you some films of the Soviet Union. It lost 20 million. Huge. 
But the German army was about how many kilometres from Moscow? Just 
close to the airport, as you enter the suburbs, there’s a place where the 
Germans were stopped. It’s called Volkalas. They were stopped there, 
then from there they drove them up to Berlin. They portray this 
patriotism – it touches you. People sacrificed so much. Some people 
stopping a machine gun, running into it to stop it so that others could 
advance. That had an impact on us who were fighting for our 
independence.54  
 
Trained in 1977, Zephaniah Moyo remembered travelling to a series of historical 
sites. He recounted a visit to Belarus to visit the grave and home of Felix 
Dzerzhinksy, ‘the first intelligence officer’, the man who (infamously) established 
the Soviet secret police in 1917. Moyo’s group was also taken to Khatyn, site of a 
notorious Nazi massacre in March 1943. Moyo explained that the site was used 
to educate young communists ‘about the horrors of the German occupation’. It 
did the same for him. He recalled being shown ‘charred bodies in glass caskets’ – 
‘you couldn’t believe it, you look at the ribs of the charred body’. They visited a 
site in the area where, 
 
some Russian soldiers were cornered and they had to sense that they 
were not to surrender but to pay … with their blood. So they used the 
blood of their fallen comrades to write on the walls before they were 
killed. They wrote, we are five and we are not prepared to surrender. We 
don’t want to be captured. We’d rather die. And they were killed. In this 
village where a lot of people were killed there were bells which were 
ringing every five minutes simultaneously, representing the whole village, 
valley, every five minutes. There was a big bronze of an old man who, 
after they were butchered, he regained consciousness and had to look 
around … for his grandson. He was able to pick him, and then he had to 
hold him so they had to make this big statue about this old man who 
survived…. It was a moving situation.  
 
Moyo compared the Nazi crushing of Khatyn to settler-ruled Rhodesia. His family 
had faced eviction when he was a child but, ‘The Zimbabwe situation wasn’t that 
bad compared to what the Germans did. When we were young we were chased 
away from the Matopos, but they only pushed down our building…. No one was 
killed mercilessly.’55  
All our interviewees retained powerful memories, decades after these 
encounters, of the scale of suffering and the bravery and sacrifice of Soviet 
soldiers in the Great Patriotic War, and derived inspiration from them. Some 
drew additional conclusions. Stool Matiwaza saw ‘that they had also suffered’ in 
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a way ‘similar to ours’ but had nonetheless managed to establish an advanced 
economy. He took a positive message from this triumph in the face of such 
terrible loss – if the Soviet Union could recover and rebuild, so too could 
Zimbabwe.56 Lazarus Ncube was inspired by the ‘hard work’ and ‘commitment’ 
that Soviet heroism had required, and he was struck especially by the 
widespread recognition of heroes ‘even in the villages’.57 In much the same vein, 
Marshall Mpofu said that he had learnt that ‘people make history’. He 
remembered thinking, ‘if our people had to be given help, maybe they could 
make their own history.... For a young man it was an empowering idea’.58 
This engagement with Soviet history was not just context for military 
training, nor was it understood simply as propaganda for a political system. It 
was portrayed perhaps above all as a lesson in the necessity of sacrifice and 
political commitment in war, and spoken of with passion by our interviewees. 
Ideological lessons were couched in this history; they were also complemented 
by social interaction and observation. Our interviewees were keen observers of 
Soviet society – of the ‘living socialism’ they encountered. As Alexei Yurchak 
writes, ‘“socialism” as a system of human values and as an everyday reality of 
“normal life” (normal’naia zhiezn’) was not necessarily equivalent to “the state” 
or “ideology”; indeed, living socialism…often meant something quite different 
from the official interpretations provided by state rhetoric.’59 ZAPU cadres’ 
judgements drew on these distinctions, as well as other considerations, notably 
their understandings of the social system against which they were fighting in 
Rhodesia, and the possibilities of revolutionary transformation at home. Later 
generations of recruits’ perspectives were also shaped by their exposure to 
socialist teaching in the ZAPU camps in Zambia and Tanzania or through visits to 
China, Ghana, Algeria and elsewhere. As with military training, the relevance to 
ZAPU’s struggle of these varied political ideas was the subject of much 
discussion.  
Our interviewees consistently insisted that they were told by their 
instructors that they should not adopt the Soviet way of doing things wholesale: 
they should choose what suited their circumstances. As Dabengwa explained:  
 
They justified their communist ideology, how it would work and so on 
and what we should expect – not because they wanted us to copy them 
but, they said, you can select the good things out of the experience we 
have had. From our communist ideology you can select what you think, if 
it is good enough for Zimbabwe, and see how you can adapt it to your own 
situation.60  
 
Later recruits such as Stool Matiwaza had already had ‘lectures on socialism and 
so forth’ in Zambian and Tanzanian camps, including from a ZAPU instructor 
who had trained in the USSR. Other members of his group of eight had trained in 
China and Ghana. This, Matiwaza held, gave them a sound basis for choosing 
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what was useful from what they learnt in the USSR. His group were already ‘all 
convinced, all committed’ to socialism as the correct goal for ZAPU and for an 
independent Zimbabwe. He recalled their understanding of socialism as a 
combination of ‘the people’ owning the ‘means of production’ and having the 
‘powers to rule the country’. As with Dabengwa, their Soviet instructors 
encouraged them to make their own choices: ‘they didn’t say go and do socialism 
at your homes comrades, but they said you are going to decide’.  For Matiwaza, 
the most important ‘political lessons’ he learned concerned the central role of the 
institution of the party in both political struggle and governance, a lesson that fit 
well with ZAPU’s own views.61 Such experiences were echoed widely, with the 
emphasis often placed on trainees’ ability to make informed choices, and the 
prior existence of strong political beliefs. As Lazarus Ncube explained, 
‘indoctrination was also there, but we had our own line and nothing could 
interfere with it’.62 
By far the most compelling political lessons remembered by our 
interviewees were those they derived from their encounters with ‘living 
socialism’, and specifically the stark contrast they saw between Soviet 
egalitarianism and provision for citizens’ needs and Rhodesia’s deeply unequal 
and discriminatory society. Ncube remembered his shock at the very idea of 
human beings being equal: ‘we couldn’t believe it when they said you are equal’. 
He continued ‘we wanted a new way of life where everyone was equal. 
Capitalism was the worst thing you could imagine’.63 The ZAPU cadres were 
astounded by what they saw as access for all to services, work and basic care. 
Abel Mazinyane recalled, there were ‘no beggars, no homeless people. It was 
striking: everyone was working.’64 Dumiso Dabengwa, who did not describe 
himself as having been a committed socialist, nonetheless remembered being 
deeply inspired that, 
  
everybody has almost an equal opportunity to prove themselves in any 
field and, without paying any [school] fees, you’d get up to the highest 
qualifications you wanted. Also we were impressed with health care, how 
everybody is looked after.… Also the issue of shelter, which are the basic 
things in life, which everybody looks for. And making sure everybody has 
an opportunity to work and have food on the table. Those were the main 
attractive things that we got to learn about. 
  
These were ideas he had wanted to emulate, and now recalled with a powerful 
sense of missed opportunity: ‘We said if only when we get back home we can 
have a government set up that will be able at least to ensure these basic 
necessities in life are taken care of – that would be our starting point’.65 
Many of our interviewees remembered being struck by what they saw as 
a lack of rigid social hierarchy in the USSR, and recalled forming the view that 
this was a result of deliberate state action. Abel Mazinyane remembered with 
wonder that poor ‘babushkas’ were able to fly on planes. The salient thing for 
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him was ‘ordinary people having access to things. From where we came from, we 
were a prisoner of the elite. That way of life convinces you there is a better way 
than the one where I’m coming from. We can also strive to achieve this.’ The 
contrast with the Rhodesian state was profound: at home, Mazinyane explained, 
‘our group was not part of anything, so the state was suppressing us. There [in 
the USSR] was a state saying everyone was equal – that was good. That was the 
main message: this state was good, it gives everyone equal opportunity.’66 
The idea that the state might work to create equal opportunities for all, 
rather than doing precisely the opposite, reinforced ZAPU cadres’ view that they 
were fighting a ‘system’ not a race.67 In these accounts, the Soviet experience 
underlined the central role of state and party in the making of a more just system 
for all. For some cadres, this marked a significant reorientation, while others felt 
it reinforced ZAPU’s longstanding non-racialism, an attribute that set it apart 
from fellow nationalists in ZANU. In either case, they elaborated their 
understandings of race in light of both the centrality of anti-racism to Soviet 
ideology and the experience of being black in the Soviet Union. Initial suspicions 
regarding racism were common, but our interviewees explained that they were 
usually overcome. For military trainees, this was at times due to the simple fact 
of enjoying the same living conditions as (white) Soviet counterparts.68 Our 
interviewees, who travelled and interacted more widely, had more varied 
encounters.  
Zephaniah Moyo recalled with some anger that, as a black policeman in 
Rhodesia, he had been treated as a labourer by his white colleagues and had 
been unable to move freely in the racially demarcated spaces of his home city of 
Bulawayo. In the Soviet Union by contrast, ‘you could go anywhere – there was 
no segregation.’69 Interactions with ordinary Soviet citizens, for whom black 
people were often an unusual oddity, could nonetheless be uncomfortable. 
Mazinyane recalled how,  
 
You’re coming from a country that is predominantly black, then you go 
there, you’re not used to being a minority. You get into a metro, an 
underground tube, everybody is looking at you. Then, in Moscow, there 
were people, they’d never seen a black person. These people would do 
certain things, you’d feel it was racialism, but these people were curious. 
They’d want to touch your skin, to touch your hair, to ask how you live in 
Africa, all those things.70 
  
Unsettling though they were, over time such approaches were often recast as the 
product of a benign interest. Moyo recalled: 
  
the reactions towards us, we could understand…. We knew there were 
not blacks in the Soviet Union, unlike America and the UK where our 
forefathers were taken as slaves…. So we were not even offended if we 
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found people who wanted to see if we were human beings…. Some 
thought we were baboons … but when they heard us greeting them in 
Russian they realized we were human beings.71  
 
Stool Matiwaza described greatly enjoying his exceptional status on the Moscow 
excursions he and his comrades embarked on outside their lectures: 
 
You could go anywhere around Moscow and talk to anybody, going by 
myself or two or three of us. You know in those days, in the 1970s, black 
people were very few in Moscow so they were very much interested in 
you….. They’d ask if you were from Africa or America. They’d say, oh, how 
is Africa? It was very interesting. They’d take you as friends.72 
 
Ronnie Patel, an Asian cadre who lived for many years in Moscow, underlined 
the contrast between the racism of recent times and his past experience: ‘there is 
racism now, but not then – I can’t remember a single incident’.73 
Many of our interviewees remembered with great warmth the genuine, 
often moving, sympathy they met when they identified themselves as freedom 
fighters, a category that made sense of their race and placed them in a particular 
political frame. Some dwelt on the welcome they received from hosts on visits 
away from training centres. Lazarus Ncube affectionately recalled apple picking 
on a cooperative in the Ukraine.74 Dabengwa remembered a trip to visit 
agricultural cooperatives in Azerbaijan. They were largely run by women who 
asked them what they were fighting for. When they explained,   
 
Some of them said, come on, forget about that. Smith has grabbed your 
country and he’s not going to give it back to you. There are beautiful girls 
here – why don’t you stay, stay here and get married! You’re welcome into 
our cooperative! They were very kind to us, very nice. They wanted to 
make us as comfortable as possible.75 
 
Indeed, visits to cooperatives were singled out by all interviewees as a source of 
inspiration for their ambitions for a future Zimbabwe.  They greatly impressed 
Dabengwa: ‘that’s why we said when we get back home we must have 
cooperatives operating like these ones.’76 Moyo came to the same conclusion. 
Cooperatives made sense to him: ‘Those coops, they shared the means of 
production, tractors, whatever, so even when I grew up here as a small boy, we 
used to share the means of production, a hoe, span of oxen, scotch cart, wheel 
barrow, and so on. So it was similar, but in an advanced stage’.77  
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75 Interview, Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 13 December 2014. 
76 Interview, Dabengwa, Bulawayo, 13 December 2014; Interview, Mazinyane, Bulawayo, 11 
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77 Interview, Moyo, Bulawayo, 9 December 2014. 
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These memories were not of course devoid of criticism in regard to both 
ideology and practice. Dabengwa for example was not convinced by what he saw 
as utopian aspects of communism. He explained, 
 
We had a lot of arguments.… We ... said it out. We were very frank: we had 
misgivings about communism. Not from the propaganda we were reading 
about communism, but really looking at it and seeing how it could really 
come to a stage where they would say they have now achieved what they 
wanted to achieve under the communist system. Everyone is equal, that 
sort of thing, and there would be no need for policemen in that stage…. 
But that didn’t seem realistic. 
 
Dabengwa had additional concerns about the applicability of the Soviet model of 
political organisation. He said that he had held that ZAPU should remain a mass 
movement rather than adopt the selective membership of the CPSU and he felt 
that the demarcations between party, government and military had been 
insufficiently clear in the Soviet Union, a situation that could lead to abuses of 
power.78 Many of our interviewees remembered having been aware of the levels 
of control and surveillance that existed in Soviet society. Some felt this was to be 
expected in the context of intelligence training,79 while others argued that ‘the 
social part’ of the Soviet model ‘was OK, but at the same time there was too much 
control. The USSR had the highest KGB presence. You didn’t know who the hell 
you were talking to.’80  
These sorts of criticisms tended to be magnified by the end of the Cold 
War, and in some cases, return visits to Russia. Our interviewees recounted how 
there were things ‘we didn’t see’ the first time around, such as the extent of 
restrictions on freedoms, the divisions and tensions among nationalities, the 
dissidents who ‘were there, but we didn’t know them’.81 Matiwaza recalled how 
he ‘used to admire socialism’, but had revised his opinion after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.82  
Their contemporary misgivings and later disillusionments 
notwithstanding, these ZAPU cadres’ accounts of their experiences of the USSR 
all described ways in which they had been profoundly and positively 
transformed. Ronnie Patel felt that without his Soviet exposure he would have 
been ‘just another Indian with a business and making money’.83 Marshall Mpofu 
singled out his enduring commitment to ‘social justice’ as a legacy of his time in 
the USSR. As he put it, ‘We all need some equality somehow’.84 Many of these 
men credited their Soviet training with giving them a ‘revolutionary vision’, 
which they contrasted to that of their nationalist leaders.85  
The lasting ability of episodes of Soviet training to shape lives is striking. 
In the case of these ZAPU cadres, the most powerful influences derived less from 
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the classroom exegesis of ideology than from the myriad of interactions with 
Soviet citizens and military instructors, their direct observation of life in the 
Soviet Union and their understanding of the great sacrifices of Soviet history, all 
viewed through the lens of Rhodesia. 
 
Conclusion 
By way of conclusion, let us return to the questions we raised at the outset of this 
article.  ZAPU intelligence cadres’ oral histories allow us to address some of these 
questions more fully than others.  They underline the rich potential of oral 
sources to open up new areas of debate in a body of literature where their prior 
use has been scant.  But at the same time, they highlight limitations such that 
many of our conclusions must remain tentative.   
Military training and the exposure to ‘living socialism’ and Soviet history 
certainly had powerful and lasting effects on our interviewees’ lives. Their 
accounts demonstrate the wide-ranging and sometimes surprising nature of 
exchanges that took place in a variety of venues and with a great mix of 
interlocutors, from urban citizens to members of agricultural cooperatives to 
veterans of the USSR’s Great Patriotic War. Visits to monuments and viewings of 
films left vivid memories of Soviet sacrifice and heroism, and sat alongside the 
ideological lessons learned in classroom settings and more technically oriented 
military training. These varied interactions take us beyond questions of how 
Soviet exposure influenced military and political strategy.86 They also indicate 
just how difficult it is to trace genealogies of influence. The intelligence cadres 
we interviewed recounted a familiar ZAPU narrative that emphasised the 
movement’s professionalism and autonomy, but they also revealed a bewildering 
array of influences accumulated over the course of the struggle that included but 
went beyond Soviet teachings. These derived not only from repeated attempts to 
modify practices to suit the specificity of Rhodesian conditions but also from 
experiences in Cuba and China, as well as in host countries all over the African 
continent, from Algeria and Ghana to the Frontline States of southern Africa.  
When pressed to identify undiluted Soviet influences our interviewees 
cited the use of titles such as ‘commissar’,87 the role played by anti-aircraft 
weaponry, and the adoption of certain intelligence practices and devices.88 They 
also singled out the idea of cooperative production. Cooperatives were instituted 
in the camps in Zambia, in guerrilla assembly points at the war’s end, and in 
ZAPU-owned businesses and farms after 1980.89 As we have seen, our 
interviewees’ experience of Soviet agricultural cooperatives had been 
overwhelmingly positive. However, the adoption of cooperatives, like so much 
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else, nonetheless demanded an assessment of their suitability to Zimbabwean 
conditions. As Zephaniah Moyo put it, cooperatives were, ‘the one thing we 
thought we should borrow from the Soviets because it was similar to the African 
communal understanding of life, where means of production were shared’.90  
An evaluation of Soviet influence thus requires careful exploration of 
history, context and politics, including an understanding of how internal ZAPU 
politics intersected with outside support. Even where practices or ideas were 
adopted from Soviet sources, the reasons for and route of that adoption may 
have had little to do with any direct transfer of a particular ‘model’ or the 
application of a ‘blueprint’. Our interviewees echo those authors who emphasise 
the varied interactions and influences of ‘Second World’ support on a 
heterogeneous set of liberation movements, the political strategies and 
ideologies of which cannot be reduced to the binaries of the Cold War.91 
The ZAPU intelligence cadres’ recollections we have explored here do not 
provide anything like a fully realized exploration of social and cultural aspects of 
African military trainees’ experiences of the Soviet Union. They do however 
diverge dramatically from accounts of African students in this era. Our 
interviewees’ stories were strikingly positive. They carried no echo of the 
‘condescending paternalism’ that Maxim Matusevich casts as central to African 
students’ experiences,92 and not one of our interviewees complained of ‘drab 
lifestyles [and] everyday regimentation’.93 This was in part due to the shorter, 
strategic nature of military intelligence training, the fact that ‘regimentation’ and 
surveillance were considered normal by soldiers, and the close connection 
between Soviet military support and ZAPU’s ability to achieve its goals. These 
utilitarian considerations, combined with a strong belief in their own autonomy 
and choice on the one hand, and an appreciation of Soviet history and society on 
the other, left our interviewees with a powerful sense of gratitude towards their 
hosts.  
These ZAPU cadres’ accounts of Soviet training also underline the strong 
divergence between experiences in the USSR and in African host nations, where 
liberation movements themselves often dominated the institution of the ‘camp’. 
More needs to be done to explore experiences in other countries beyond the 
African continent where substantial training took place, particularly Cuba and 
China, but also other Eastern Bloc countries. It nonetheless seems clear from our 
oral histories that Soviet experiences were unique in some ways. Our 
interviewees’ narratives convey a sense of awe in the face of Soviet heroism in 
World War II and Soviet technology – and even Soviet winters. They looked back 
with wonder at their warm embrace by a superpower advocating an alternative 
to Western capitalism and expounding what seemed an unimaginably radical 
notion of ‘equality’. They stressed the privilege of having had the opportunity to 
experience the Soviet Union first hand. These soldiers’ recollections shed new 
light on African encounters with the USSR that take us into a rich world of social 
exchange. 
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